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THE HELLER PROMISE VERSUS THE 
HELLER REALITY: WILL STATUTES 
PROHIBITING THE POSSESSION OF 
FIREARMS BY EX-FELONS BE UPHELD 
AFTER BRITT V. STATE? 
Deborah Bone∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With its decision in Britt v. State,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court 
became the first court in the country to hold that a statute criminalizing 
firearm possession by an ex-felon is unconstitutional as applied to the 
challenging plaintiff under a state constitution.2  In the wake of the United 
States Supreme Court’s rulings in District of Columbia v. Heller3 and 
McDonald v. City of Chicago,4 will other state and local statutes prohibiting 
the possession of firearms by ex-felons be upheld?  A close reading of both 
Britt and Heller in light of many of the firearm regulatory schemes 
currently in place in various jurisdictions indicates that felon possession 
statutes may very well be in danger, despite the Heller majority’s 
unsupported assertion that these regulations are “longstanding” and 
“presumptively lawful.”5 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2011; B.A., 
Pennsylvania State University, 2006.  Many thanks to all who assisted me in completing this 
Comment.  In particular, I would like to thank Dorothy Roberts for her comments and 
suggestions. 
1 Britt v. North Carolina, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009). 
2 Id. at 321. 
3 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment creates an individual right to bear arms).  Many state constitutions have 
amendments that have provisions similar to the Second Amendment that would present 
issues for upholding regulatory schemes.  See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; MO. CONST. 
art. I, § 23; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30. 
4 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
5 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–2817, 2817 n.26. 
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The question of whether states can lawfully prevent ex-felons from 
firearm possession merges Second Amendment jurisprudence with the 
debate over the reintegration of ex-felons and restoration of their rights.  In 
this Comment, I argue that it will be difficult for regulations that prevent 
certain nonviolent ex-felons from possessing firearms to withstand scrutiny 
if firearm possession is indeed an individual right as Heller and McDonald 
suggest.6 
Part II of this Comment will explore the various state and federal felon 
firearm possession regulatory schemes in place throughout the country.  
Part III will discuss and analyze the North Carolina Supreme Court’s 
decision in Britt v. State and the particular facts that led the court to 
determine that the North Carolina statute was unconstitutional as applied.  
Part IV will suggest that the ruling in Britt v. State could easily occur in 
other jurisdictions, both local and federal, and evaluates whether the 
relevant felon possession statutes in particular jurisdictions will withstand 
constitutional scrutiny in light of Heller and McDonald.  Part V of the 
Comment will consider whether nonviolent ex-felons should, in fact, be 
prevented from firearm possession after they have completed their 
sentences, and Part VI will suggest methods available to revise felon 
possession statutes to ensure that they both protect the rights of ex-felons 
and withstand scrutiny under an individual rights model. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING EX-FELONS AND 
FIREARM POSSESSION 
A. FEDERAL LAW 
The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution protects 
“the right of the people to keep and bear [a]rms.”7  The Federal Firearms 
Statute, however, prohibits the possession of a firearm by any person “who 
has been convicted in any court of . . . a crime punishable by imprisonment 
for a term exceeding one year.”8  The federal statute establishes an 
 
6 In Heller, the Court shifted from the premise that the Second Amendment protected a 
collective right to bear arms (i.e. the right to bear arms in a militia) to an individual rights 
approach.  Compare id. at 2797, with Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) 
(upholding restrictions on the use of firearms in part because the Second Amendment 
protects only a collective right to bear arms).  The Court continued to operate under an 
individual rights approach in McDonald.  130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010). 
7 The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to 
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
8 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). 
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exception for ex-felons who have had their civil rights restored by the 
sentencing jurisdiction from the otherwise broad prohibition against firearm 
possession, provided that the state restoration of rights does not otherwise 
restrict possession.9  Several circuit courts have interpreted this exception to 
mean that “[i]f state law has restored civil rights to a felon, without 
expressly limiting the felon’s firearms privileges, that felon is not subject to 
federal firearms disabilities.”10  Additionally, until 1961, the Federal 
Firearms Act was also limited in that it only prohibited ex-felons convicted 
of a “crime of violence” from possessing a firearm.11 
Prior to Heller, the original Federal Firearms Act was challenged in 
two circuit courts under the Second Amendment, and both circuit courts 
upheld the statute on the grounds that the Second Amendment did not 
create an individual right to bear arms,12 a premise that the Supreme Court 
has since rejected.13  In one case, the First Circuit particularly focused on 
the fact that the appellant was not using his weapon as a “member of any 
military organization or . . . us[ing] the weapon . . . in preparation for a 
military career.”14  The court went on to note that: 
the only inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in the indictment 
was in possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and ammunition purely and 
simply on a frolic of his own and without any thought or intention of contributing to 
 
9 See id. § 921(a)(20).  The statute provides that:  
[w]hat constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of 
the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.  Any conviction which has been expunged, 
or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be 
considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or 
restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or 
receive firearms. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
10 Unites States v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); see also 
United States v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1066, 1069 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gomez, 911 
F.2d 219, 220 (9th Cir. 1990). 
11 Federal Firearms Act of 1938, ch. 850, § 1(6), 52 Stat. 1250, 1250–51 (1938), as 
amended by An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87–342, 75 Stat. 
757 (1961).  A “crime of violence” included “murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, 
kidnapping, burglary, housebreaking; assault with intent to kill, commit rape, or rob; assault 
with a dangerous weapon, or assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year.”  Id. at 1250.  
12 See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 923 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v. Tot, 
131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942). 
13 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms). 
14 Cases, 131 F.2d at 923. 
1636 DEBORAH BONE [Vol. 100 
the efficiency of the well regulated militia which the Second Amendment was designed 
to foster as necessary to the security of a free state.15 
While the United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the 
constitutionality of prohibitions against the restoration of an ex-felon’s right 
to possess firearms, the Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, 
commented in dicta on the government’s ability to regulate the possession 
of firearms by ex-felons.16 
Most recently, the Supreme Court has suggested that prohibitions 
against the possession of firearms by ex-felons are valid.  In both District of 
Columbia v. Heller17 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,18 the Court, in 
dicta, called prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
“longstanding” and “presumptively lawful.”19  The Court, however, did not 
cite to a single authority to support its assertion that regulations prohibiting 
the possession of firearms by felons are valid.20 
Similarly, in United States v. Emerson,21 the Fifth Circuit stated, also 
in dicta, that a ban on firearm possession by ex-felons “is in no way 
inconsistent with an individual rights model.”22  To support the validity of 
laws preventing ex-felons from possession, the Fifth Circuit relied only 
 
15 Id. (emphasis added). 
16 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010); Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 
2816–17; Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64–65 (1980).  
17 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2783. 
18 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047. 
19 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17.  The D.C. Circuit made a similar assertion regarding 
felon possession regulations: “These regulations promote the government’s interest in public 
safety consistent with our common law tradition.  Just as importantly, however, they do not 
impair the core conduct upon which the right was premised.”  Parker v. District of Columbia, 
478 F.3d 370, 399 (2007) (distinguishing Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65 n.8).  As discussed infra, the 
Court’s holding in Lewis was eroded by Heller. 
20 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17 (“Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical 
analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be 
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and 
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.”).  The majority opinion in McDonald adopted this language 
verbatim, again without any citations or support.  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.  
21 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001). 
22 Id. at 226 n.21.  In Emerson, a Texas court issued a temporary injunction that, inter 
alia, prevented a party to a contentious divorce proceeding from obtaining a firearm until the 
proceeding was complete.  Id. at 211 n.2.  The court’s holding that felon possession statutes 
can exist in an individual-rights model is especially noteworthy after the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Heller. 
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upon law review articles from the 1980s to suggest that America at its 
founding excluded felons from the right to bear arms.23 
The closest the Supreme Court came to ruling on the constitutionality 
of felon possession laws was in Lewis v. United States.24  In Lewis, the 
petitioner challenged his conviction for felon firearm possession under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by 
arguing that his prior state conviction was invalid because he was not 
adequately represented by counsel.25  The Court upheld the statute, focusing 
on the fact that the petitioner could have challenged the validity of his prior 
conviction in state court but failed to do so.26  The Court went on to find 
that: 
[t]he firearm regulatory scheme at issue . . . is consonant with the concept of equal 
protection embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if there is 
some rational basis for the statutory distinctions made . . . or . . . [if] they have some 
relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.27 
As was the case with the earlier circuit court cases, the Supreme Court 
pointed to the collective-right theory of the Second Amendment to support 
the validity of the regulatory scheme, a theory that Heller has since 
disposed of in favor of an individual rights model.28  In essence, Heller’s 
adoption of an individual rights theory of the Second Amendment 
invalidates the holding in Lewis and wipes the slate clean of case law 
 
23 Id. at 226 n.21 (citing Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the 
Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 96 (1983) (“Colonial and English 
societies of the eighteenth century, as well as their modern counterparts, have excluded 
infants, idiots, lunatics, and felons [from possessing firearms].”); Stephen P. Halbrook, What 
the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms,” 49 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (1986) (“[V]iolent criminals, children, and those of unsound mind 
may be deprived of firearms . . . .”); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the 
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 266 (1983) (“Nor does 
it seem that the Founders considered felons within the common law right to arms or intended 
to confer any such right upon them.”).  For a thorough criticism of the historical analyses 
conducted in these articles, see C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 
32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 698–707 (2009). 
24 445 U.S. 55 (1980). 
25 Id. at 56–58. 
26 Id. at 64–65. 
27 Id. at 65 (internal quotation omitted). 
28 Id. at 65 n.8 (“These legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based 
upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected 
liberties”); see also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the 
Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have “some 
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”).  But 
see District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms). 
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directly supporting ex-felon possession restrictions—except, of course, that 
the Heller opinion calls such laws permissible.29 
B. STATE LAW 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,30 states were generally thought to have the ability to regulate 
firearms pursuant to their general police powers.31  In McDonald, the Court 
held that the Second Amendment applies to state regulations.32  Since the 
Court’s application of the Second Amendment to state regulation is 
extremely recent, it has yet to be seen how incorporation will impact state 
firearm regulatory frameworks and felon firearm possession laws more 
specifically. 
Current state laws regulating firearms generally, as well as regulations 
regarding the prohibition and restoration of firearm ownership by ex-felons 
more specifically, vary greatly from state to state.  Some jurisdictions, such 
as Montana, essentially permit automatic restoration of all rights, including 
the right to firearm ownership, upon the completion of an ex-felon’s 
sentence.33  Other states have a process by which an ex-felon can move to 
have his right to firearm possession restored upon the completion of his 
sentence, usually by petitioning the court and presenting evidence that he 
does not pose a danger to the community.34  Many states have statutes 
similar to the federal provisions outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 922, prohibiting 
persons convicted of any felony from the possession of firearms, regardless 
 
29 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17. 
30 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010). 
31 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1886) (finding that the Second Amendment 
“is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon 
that of the States”).  Of course, most state constitutions have their own provisions regarding 
the right to bear arms.  See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23; N.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 30. 
32 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036. 
33 MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28(2) (“Full rights are restored by termination of state 
supervision for any offense against the state.”).  Another method is to automatically restore 
full rights after a certain number of years have passed since the completion of the felon’s 
sentence.  See OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (2007) (restoring full ownership rights after fifteen 
years).   
34 In Washington, for example, a felon who has not been convicted of a sex offense, a 
class A felony, or a felony that carries a maximum sentence of twenty years can petition the 
court for the restoration of his right to possess a firearm if he completed his sentence at least 
five years prior to the date of the petition and has had no subsequent felony charges.  WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9.41.040(4) (West, Westlaw through all 2010 legislation). 
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of the amount of time that has passed since the completion of the felon’s 
sentence.35 
North Carolina is one of the many jurisdictions that have an outright 
prohibition against the possession of firearms by ex-felons that is similar to 
the federal restrictions.  Under North Carolina law, it is “unlawful for any 
person who has been convicted of a felony to purchase, own, possess, or 
have in his custody, care, or control any firearm or any weapon of mass 
death and destruction . . . .”36  The version of the statute that was at issue in 
Britt became effective in 2004.37 
III. ANALYSIS OF BRITT V. STATE 
A. MR. BRITT’S STORY 
In 1979, Barney Britt, a resident of Wake County, North Carolina, was 
convicted of felony possession with intent to sell and deliver a controlled 
substance in violation of state law.38  Britt completed his sentence in 1982 
and his civil rights were restored in 1987 pursuant to North Carolina law.39  
At that time, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1 allowed ex-felons to regain their 
rights to the possession of certain firearms, and Britt purchased several 
sporting rifles and shotguns for use on his property.40  In 2004, the North 
Carolina legislature amended the statute making it “unlawful for any person 
who has been convicted of a felony to purchase, own, possess, or have in 
 
35 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.070 (West 2009). 
36 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1 (2009). 
37 Id. as amended by Act of Aug. 12, 2004, ch. 186, § 14.1, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 716, 
737.  There were two prior versions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1.  Prior to 1995, the 
statute prohibited the possession of “any handgun or other firearm with a barrel length of 
less than 18 inches or an overall length of less than 26 inches” by persons convicted of 
certain violent felonies, “within five years from the date of such conviction, or unconditional 
discharge from a correctional institution, or termination of a suspended sentence, probation, 
or parole upon such conviction, whichever is later.”  Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 870, § 1, 1975 
N.C. Sess. Laws 1273.  Between 1995 and 2004, the statute no longer took the date of 
conviction or completion of sentence into consideration, but continued to permit limited 
possession of a firearm within an ex-felon’s own home or lawful place of business.  Act of 
July 26, 1995, ch. 487, § 3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1414, 1417. 
38 Britt v. North Carolina, 681 S.E.2d 320, 321 (N.C. 2009). 
39 Id. 
40 Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1 (1975).  In 1995, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–
415.1 was amended to prohibit certain uses of firearms by ex-felons, but the amended law 
still permitted possession of firearms within the ex-felon’s home or business.  Act of July 26, 
1995, ch. 487, § 3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1414, 1417. 
1640 DEBORAH BONE [Vol. 100 
his custody, care, or control any firearm or any weapon of mass death and 
destruction.”41 
Before the new law became effective, Britt voluntarily handed over his 
firearms to the Wake County sheriff.42  Britt had not been charged with any 
crimes in the thirty years since his first and only felony conviction, and 
there had been no determinations made by any court or agency that Britt 
was potentially dangerous.43  Britt filed suit against the State, alleging that 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1 infringed his state constitutional right to bear 
arms.44 
The trial court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, 
finding that the amended statute was rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest and held that the law was constitutional both on its face 
and as applied to plaintiff.45  Britt appealed the trial court’s holding, but the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the finding, again holding that 
the law was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.46 
Britt appealed his case to the state supreme court.  The only issue 
under review by the court was “[w]hether the application of the 2004 
amendment . . . to plaintiff violates his rights under [the North Carolina 
Constitution].”47 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–
415.1 is an “unreasonable regulation” as applied to the plaintiff.48  The 
North Carolina constitution provides that “[a] well regulated militia being 
 
41 Act of July 15, 2004, ch. 186, § 14.1, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 716, 737.  The statute 
makes no distinctions regarding the date of conviction. 
42 Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  The North Carolina constitution provides, in a manner similar to the federal 
Constitution, that “[a] well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, 
the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.”  N.C. CONST. art. I, 
§ 30. 
45 Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322. 
46 Britt v. State, 649 S.E.2d 402, 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).  Judge Elmore dissented 
from the Court of Appeals’ decision, arguing that the statute unconstitutionally “stripped 
plaintiff of his constitutional right to bear arms without the benefit of due process.”  Id. at 
410 (Elmore, J., dissenting). 
47 Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322. 
48 Id. at 323 (“Based on the facts of plaintiff’s crime, his long post-conviction history of 
respect for the law, the absence of any evidence of violence by plaintiff, and the lack of any 
exception or possible relief from the statute’s operation, as applied to plaintiff, the 2004 
version of [the statute] is an unreasonable regulation, not fairly related to the preservation of 
public peace and safety.  In particular, it is unreasonable to assert that a nonviolent citizen 
who has responsibly, safely, and legally owned and used firearms for seventeen years is in 
reality so dangerous that any possession at all of a firearm would pose a significant threat to 
public safety.”). 
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necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear arms shall not be infringed.”49  The state supreme court relied 
primarily upon State v. Dawson, a decision where the court previously held 
that any regulation on the state constitutional right to bear arms must be 
“reasonable and not prohibitive, and must bear a fair relation to the 
preservation of the public peace and safety.”50  Unlike the lower courts, the 
state supreme court found that the State could not reasonably imply that Mr. 
Britt individually possessed a significant threat to public safety.51  The court 
focused heavily on the fact that Mr. Britt’s felony conviction was for a 
nonviolent crime, and that Mr. Britt had not only been a law-abiding citizen 
for the past thirty years, but had also safely possessed firearms for thirteen 
of those thirty years.52 
While the court only found that the law was unconstitutional as applied 
to this particular plaintiff, the holding is still extremely significant in that it 
is the first time any state court has held a state felon firearm possession law 
to be unconstitutional on any grounds, as applied or otherwise.53 
Dissenting justices argued that the statute was a reasonable regulation 
both on its face and as applied to the plaintiff, and that State v. Dawson 
illustrated that the right to bear arms is in fact subject to regulation.54  The 
dissent compared the statute to laws preventing mentally ill persons from 
possessing firearms, noting that both regulations further the public policy of 
protecting the safety and general welfare of the public at large.55  The 
dissent also cited dicta from State v. Jackson,56 where the court associated a 
heightened public danger with felons possessing firearms and applauded 
 
49 N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30. 
50 159 S.E.2d 1, 10 (N.C. 1968). 
51 Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 323. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 323 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (“Because the majority has crafted an 
individualized exception for a sympathetic plaintiff, thereby placing North Carolina in the 
unique position of being the first jurisdiction, either federal or state, to hold that the inherent 
police power of the State must yield to a convicted felon’s right to own a firearm, I 
respectfully dissent.”) (emphasis added). 
54 Id. at 323–24. 
55 See id. at 324 (“In addition to regulating the place and manner in which an individual 
may exercise his right to bear arms, the General Assembly may also properly regulate—to 
the point of absolute restriction—certain classes of persons reasonably deemed by the 
legislature to pose a threat to public peace and safety.  Thus, in addition to convicted felons, 
our statutes unequivocally prohibit incompetents, persons acquitted by reason of insanity of 
any crime (whether violent or nonviolent), and persons subject to domestic violence orders 
from purchasing, owning, or possessing firearms.”) (citations omitted).  
56 546 S.E.2d 570, 573–74 (2001). 
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N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1, which was actually slightly less restrictive at 
the time of the case.57 
B. THE BRITT AFTERMATH 
Since, under North Carolina law,58 Mr. Britt had his civil rights 
restored after he completed his sentence, he was not prohibited from 
possessing a firearm under the Federal Firearms Act unless North Carolina 
prohibited possession.59  As of yet, it is unclear whether the North Carolina 
Supreme Court’s holding will automatically extend to other felons in North 
Carolina who present the same absence of lawlessness and dangerousness 
that Mr. Britt established.  The North Carolina Court of Appeals has, 
however, developed a test for similar claims in the wake of the Britt 
holding.60  A North Carolina appellate court interpreted the state supreme 
court’s holding to have developed a five-factor test that evaluates: 
(1) the type of felony convictions, particularly whether they “involved violence or the 
threat of violence[,]” (2) the remoteness in time of the felony convictions; (3) the 
felon’s history of “law-abiding conduct since [the] crime,” (4) the felon’s history of 
“responsible, lawful firearm possession” during a time period when possession of 
firearms was not prohibited, and (5) the felon’s “assiduous and proactive compliance 
with the 2004 amendment.”61 
These factors are used to determine whether the statute “is a 
reasonable regulation which is ‘fairly related to the preservation of public 
peace and safety’ as to defendant.”62 
It is certainly still reasonable to assume, as did the dissent in Britt, that 
additional ex-felons of more similar standing to Mr. Britt will come forward 
 
57 Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 324 (“Just as there is heightened risk and public concern 
associated with firearms on educational property, which the legislature addressed through 
[N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–269.2,] there is also heightened risk and public concern associated 
with convicted felons possessing firearms, which the legislature addressed through [N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1].  Both are exceptional situations, which have been addressed through 
dedicated statutory law.” (quoting Jackson, 546 S.E.2d at 573–74 (2001))). 
58 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415 (2005). 
59 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). 
60 State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 404 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
61 Id. (quoting Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322). 
62 Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d at 404 (quoting Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 323).  The court held that the 
plaintiff in Whitaker did not pass the five-factor test and therefore the statute was not 
unconstitutional as applied to him.  The plaintiff in Whitaker was convicted of three 
felonies—with one conviction as recent as 2005, and including a crime against a child.  Mr. 
Whitaker’s criminal record is therefore not comparable to that of Mr. Britt.  Whitaker, 689 
S.E.2d at 404–05. 
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to make similar claims in the wake of the court’s holdings.63  Indeed, the 
North Carolina state legislature has already proposed revisions to the state 
Felony Firearms Act to permit limited hunting privileges upon the 
completion of their sentences for ex-felons convicted of nonviolent 
felonies.64 
IV. COULD COURTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS HOLD SIMILARLY TO THE 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT? 
Whether or not a similar holding would be possible in other 
jurisdictions depends largely on the interplay between each jurisdiction’s 
specific constitutional provisions protecting the right to bear arms and the 
jurisdiction’s statutory framework prohibiting ex-felons from firearm 
possession.65  After McDonald, state regulations must also pass muster 
under the Second Amendment.66  Even regulations that are valid under the 
Second Amendment, however, may be struck under state constitutional 
theories.  The following paragraphs explore state and federal firearm 
regulatory frameworks to determine the viability of statutes prohibiting gun 
ownership by ex-felons. 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER STATES 
Many states have broad statutes similar to North Carolina’s67 that 
prohibit the possession of firearms by all ex-felons, and similarly broad 
 
63 Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 325 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision opens 
the floodgates wide before an inevitable wave of individual challenges to not only the Felony 
Firearms Act, but to our statutory provisions prohibiting firearm possession by incompetents 
and the mentally insane.”). 
64 H.B. 1444, 2009 Gen. Assem., 2009 Sess. (N.C. 2009).  If passed, the bill would 
permit applicants who (1) have had rights of citizenship restored; (2) have “only one felony 
conviction and the rights of citizenship lost because of the conviction for that felony were 
restored pursuant to Chapter 13 of the General Statutes at least 20 years before the date of 
the permit application[;]” (3) have “not been convicted of any subsequent felony or any 
subsequent misdemeanor[;]” and (4) have “been of good behavior for the period since the 
date of conviction of the felony conviction” to possess certain firearms, provided the 
applicant was not convicted of offense that include assault or the possession of a firearm or 
suffers from a physical infirmity.  § 14–415.42(a). 
65 The Federal Firearms Act does not prohibit ex-felons who have had their civil rights 
restored by the appropriate jurisdiction from possessing firearms.  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) 
(2006).  Absent a change to the federal statue, only the states that restore civil rights upon 
reentry, such as North Carolina, need be concerned about ex-felons gaining the ability to 
own firearms.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2009). 
66 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010). 
67 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.070 (West 2010).  
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constitutional protections for the right to bear arms.68  These states are most 
likely to encounter challenges to their firearm possession regulations.  
Several states, however, have more narrowly tailored provisions that may 
better withstand challenges on individual rights grounds.69 
1. Viable State Felon Possession Laws Based on State Constitutional 
Provisions 
Idaho is the only state to explicitly provide in its constitution that the 
state can pass legislation to prohibit a felon’s possession of firearms.70  The 
Florida constitution has a broader exception to the right, as it explicitly 
qualifies that the right to bear arms “shall not be infringed, except that the 
manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.”71  The Florida state 
legislature passed a broad felon firearm possession statute that prohibits 
persons convicted of any felony from owning, possessing, or controlling a 
firearm.72  In Florida, if the statute were challenged as an unconstitutional 
violation of the state constitutional right to bear arms, the regulations would 
most likely be upheld since the state constitution explicitly provides that the 
state can regulate this right, although there still would be room for as-
applied challenges.73 
2. Viable State Felon Possession Laws Based on Narrowly Drafted Statutes 
Other states have more narrowly tailored statutory schemes.  
Wyoming, for example, only prohibits “[a]ny person who has previously 
pleaded guilty to or been convicted of committing or attempting to commit 
a violent felony or a felony [against a peace officer]” from using or 
possessing a firearm.74  Wyoming’s state constitution, on the other hand, is 
very broad: “The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and 
 
68 See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. I, § 23. 
69 Compare, e.g., WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24, with WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-102 (2009). 
70 “The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall not be abridged; 
but this provision shall not . . . prevent the passage of legislation providing penalties for the 
possession of firearms by a convicted felon . . . .”  IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11. 
71 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8(a) (emphasis added). 
72 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23 (West 2007). 
73 A few other states have similar constitutional provisions giving state legislatures some 
level of authority to regulate the right to bear arms.  See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ VIII; UTAH 
CONST. art. I, § 6. 
74 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-102 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 159:3 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.) (prohibiting only those who have committed a felony 
against the person or property of another, or who have committed a drug-related felony from 
possessing firearms). 
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of the state shall not be denied.”75  If the Wyoming statute were challenged, 
the regulations would likely be upheld even if the same standard from the 
North Carolina court were used.  Under the Wyoming statute, it will be 
much easier for the state to prove a legitimate state interest in prohibiting 
firearm possession, since the Wyoming statute only prevents felons with a 
violent history from possessing firearms, unlike the statute in North 
Carolina.76 
Still, many states’ constitutional provisions and statutory schemes are 
very similar to those of North Carolina.77  These state courts could 
potentially decide, as the North Carolina Supreme Court did,78 that felon 
firearm possession statutes are unconstitutional if challenged by similarly 
sympathetic plaintiffs.  Many felonies are nonviolent in nature, and proving 
that ex-felons who commit these crimes are indeed “dangerous” may be 
difficult if states do not revise their regulatory frameworks.79  In the wake 
of Britt, it is likely that more nonviolent ex-felons will come forward to 
challenge state laws.80 
B. PRIOR STATE CHALLENGES 
Thus far, few plaintiffs have challenged their state’s felon firearm 
possession statutes on constitutional grounds, and none had done so 
successfully until Britt.81  Generally, the statutes that have been challenged 
are actually less restrictive than the statute at issue in Britt.82  Still, much of 
the reasoning that the courts in previous cases relied upon has been eroded 
 
75 WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24. 
76 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-102 (2009); see also Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 
2009) (“In particular, it is unreasonable to assert that a nonviolent citizen who has 
responsibly, safely, and legally owned and used firearms for seventeen years is in reality so 
dangerous that any possession at all of a firearm would pose a significant threat to public 
safety.”) (emphasis added). 
77 Compare, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-7-103(a) (1987); 
compare also CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15, with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217 (West 
1958); MO. CONST. art. I, § 23, with MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.070 (West 2003). 
78 See Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322–23. 
79 See infra Part VI for suggestions on how jurisdictions can improve their regulatory 
frameworks to secure the validity of felon firearm possession laws. 
80 See Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 324 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting). 
81 See, e.g., Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170 (Ky. 2006); State v. Hirsch, 114 
P.3d 1104 (Or. 2005); State v. Smith, 571 A.2d 279 (N.H. 1990). 
82 The Oregon felon firearm possession statute only excludes persons convicted of a 
felony from firearm possession until fifteen years have passed after the completion of the 
felon’s sentence.  Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (1998) (applied in Hirsch, 114 P.3d at 
1106), with N.C.GEN. STAT. § 14–415 (2005) (applied in Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322). 
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by the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Heller and McDonald.83  
If courts continue toward an individual rights interpretation of the right to 
possess firearms, the precedents upholding states’ ability to restrict firearm 
possession may no longer be valid case law. 
In State v. Hirsch,84 for example, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld 
Oregon’s felon firearm possession statute.85  Oregon’s constitution provides 
that “[t]he people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of 
themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict 
subordination to the civil power.”86  The state supreme court found that the 
drafters of the state constitution did not intend to create an “absolute right to 
the possession of arms.”87  The court interpreted the provision as 
“preclud[ing] the legislature from infringing on the people’s right to bear 
arms for purposes of defense, but not for purposes other than defense.”88 
The North Carolina court did not delve into the same sort of historical 
analysis of the intent of the drafters in Britt, but the Oregon case is still 
easily distinguishable from the facts in Britt.  The statute at issue in Hirsch 
was less restrictive than the statute in Britt.89  The Oregon felon firearm 
possession statute only excludes persons convicted of a felony from firearm 
possession until fifteen years after the completion of the felon’s sentence.90  
Under the North Carolina court’s reasonableness test, even the Oregon 
statute probably would have been upheld considering the North Carolina 
court’s focus on the remoteness of the felony conviction at issue.91  Under 
the Oregon statute, ex-felons with convictions that are particularly remote 
in time would be legally able to possess firearms.92 
 
83 See, e.g., Posey, 185 S.W.3d at 179. 
84 Hirsch, 114 P.3d at 1104. 
85 Id. at 1106; OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (2009). 
86 OR. CONST. art. I, § 27. 
87 Hirsch, 114 P.3d at 1106, 1134 (describing the holding of the Oregon Court of 
Appeals, which was ultimately upheld).  
88 Id. at 1110.  It is interesting to note that the Oregon court used the language regarding 
“defense” much differently than the United States Supreme Court used the language 
regarding “the militia” in the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution.  
Compare id., with District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2008).  The 
Supreme Court held that the prefatory phrase regarding militias in the Second Amendment 
“does not limit the latter [clause], but rather announces a purpose.”  Id. at 2789. 
89 Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1 (2009), with OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (2009). 
90 OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270. 
91 See State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 404 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Britt v. State, 
681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 2009)) (outlining the North Carolina court’s five-factor test, 
including remoteness of the conviction as a factor). 
92 Incidentally, the plaintiffs in Hirsch were not nearly as sympathetic as Mr. Britt.  Mr. 
Hirsch was charged with possessing a firearm while still on parole, and Mr. Friend was 
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Another case where a state’s felon firearm possession regulations were 
upheld was State v. Smith.93  Like, North Carolina, New Hampshire has a 
broad constitutional protection of the right to bear arms.94  The New 
Hampshire court upheld the state felon firearm possession statute on the 
grounds that it is narrowly tailored to serve “a significant governmental 
interest in protecting the general public . . . .”95  The court focused on the 
fact that the statute prohibits only “persons likely to be dangerous from 
possessing dangerous weapons.”96  New Hampshire’s statute is indeed more 
narrowly tailored than the North Carolina statute.  The New Hampshire 
statute only prohibits the possession of firearms for those who have 
committed a felony against the person or property of another, or who have 
committed a drug-related felony—in essence, only prohibiting “dangerous” 
felons from possessing firearms.97 
While the New Hampshire statute is less restrictive than North 
Carolina’s statute, Mr. Britt committed a drug-related felony, and therefore, 
if he were a New Hampshire resident he would still be prohibited from 
firearm possession.98 
Kentucky’s felon possession statute has also survived scrutiny by the 
state supreme court.99  Perhaps because the statute was challenged by 
arguably the least sympathetic plaintiff of the three cases,100 the plaintiff in 
Posey tried a notably different argument.  The plaintiff did not dispute that 
the “regulation of firearms among convicted felons is supported by 
substantial and rational concerns.”101  Instead, he argued that the statute 
violated the state constitution because the “constitution expressly protects 
the convicted felon’s right to bear arms in spite of these substantial risks to 
 
charged with possessing a firearm while driving under the influence of intoxicants.  Hirsch, 
114 P.3d at 1106. 
93 571 A.2d 279, 280 (N.H. 1990). 
94 “All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves, their 
families, their property and the state.”  N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 2-a. 
95 Smith, 571 A.2d at 281. 
96 Id.  
97 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:3 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.); see also Smith, 571 A.2d 
at 281. 
98 Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 321 (N.C. 2009). 
99 Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 172 (Ky. 2006). 
100 The plaintiff in Posey was arrested after officers searching for a different suspect 
found and seized shotgun shells, individually wrapped packets of marijuana, and a firearm in 
plain view in plaintiff’s home.  Id. 
101 Id. at 176. 
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public welfare and safety.”102  Nevertheless, the Kentucky court was not 
convinced.103 
Kentucky Revised Statute § 527.040 prohibits the “possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon . . . when he has been convicted of a felony, as 
defined by the laws of the jurisdiction in which he was convicted.”104  The 
Kentucky Constitution, on the other hand, provides that: 
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable 
rights, among which may be reckoned . . . .  The right to bear arms in defense of 
themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact 
laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons.105 
The Kentucky Supreme Court used the single footnote in Emerson106 
to find that, historically, felons were not permitted to possess firearms.107  
The court also found, as the Oregon court did, that the “defense” language 
in the state constitution illustrated that the right to bear arms was not 
absolute.108  Taken together, the court determined that the statute is 
“‘reasonable legislation in the interest of public safety’ [and] since nothing 
in the constitution, either express or implied, undermines or prohibits such 
legislation, [the statute is] constitutional.”109 
 
102 Id. (emphasis added). 
103 Id. at 177. 
104 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.040(1) (2010).  The statute, however, only applies to 
persons convicted after January 1, 1975 with respect to handguns, and only applies to 
persons convicted before July 15, 1994 with respect to other firearms.  Id § 527.040(4).  If 
Mr. Britt were a Kentucky resident, he would not have been prevented from possessing the 
rifles, since his felony conviction occurred prior to the statute. 
105 KY. CONST. § 1. 
106 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 226 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing scholarship 
that claims that at America’s founding, ex-felons were not considered to be citizens).  See 
supra note 22. 
107 Posey, 185 S.W.3d at 178.  The dissent vehemently disputed this historical analysis.  
See id. at 198–200 (Scott, J., dissenting). 
108 Id. at 180.  It is interesting that the court focused on the self-defense language to show 
that the right to bear arms is not absolute, instead of focusing on the language explicitly 
permitting the legislature to “enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed 
weapons.”  It is also curious that the constitutional provision explicitly provides for 
prohibitions against concealed weapons, but not against felon firearm possession.  KY. 
CONST. § 1(7).  Several other states have similar provisions regarding concealed weapons in 
their state constitutions.  See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; MISS. 
CONST. art. III, § 12; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.M. CONST. art. II, 
§ 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30.  However, none of these constitutions say anything regarding 
felon possession.  Only Idaho’s constitution specifically permits laws against felon 
possession.  IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11. 
109 Posey, 185 S.W.3d at 181 (internal citations omitted).  
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If the North Carolina court dealt with the same facts and law at issue in 
Posey, it would likely still have found the statute unconstitutional as applied 
to Mr. Britt, but not as applied to Mr. Posey.  The major difference between 
the two cases is the dangerousness, or at least lawlessness, of the two 
plaintiffs.  Mr. Posey was found possessing a firearm while engaging in 
other illegal acts,110 whereas Mr. Britt had been a law-abiding member of 
the community for thirty years.111  According to the North Carolina 
appellate court’s five-factor test, the type of felony conviction is heavily 
considered in a determination of whether the statute is constitutionally 
applied.112 
Not every state court will follow North Carolina’s lead and poke holes 
in its state’s felon firearm possession statutes, but there is certainly the 
potential for finding that many of these statutory schemes are 
unconstitutional, at least as applied to particular plaintiffs.  This possibility 
is strengthened when considering the ever-growing class of ex-felons who 
were convicted of nonviolent felonies.113 
C. IMPACT ON FEDERAL LAW 
While North Carolina’s ruling has no direct effect on federal law, the 
state’s decision may foreshadow the direction future federal decisions could 
take, especially given the recent federal court decisions on Second 
Amendment jurisprudence.114 
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court interpreted the Second 
Amendment as an individual right to bear arms.115  The majority in Heller 
declared that its decision did not impact the validity of felon firearm 
possession restrictions.116  The Court noted the prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons were “longstanding” and “presumptively 
lawful,” but did not cite any supporting authorities.117  The Court made this 
 
110 Id. at 172. 
111 Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 2009). 
112 State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 404 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Britt, 681 S.E.2d 
at 322). 
113 Every year, state courts convict about 800,000 additional nonviolent felons.  See 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE 
COURTS, 2004, at 1 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf.  
114 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010); District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008). 
115 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.  Coincidentally, the Court specifically notes that North 
Carolina’s constitutional provision providing for the right to bear arms is very similar to the 
Second Amendment.  Id. at 2802. 
116 Id. at 2816–17.  The Court repeated this assertion in McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047. 
117 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17. 
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assertion despite its lengthy review of the drafting history of the Second 
Amendment, and subsequent conclusion that the right to bear arms was 
considered a fundamental, individual right related to the right of self-
defense.118  The Court even quoted eighteenth century scholars such as 
William Rawle to suggest that, at founding, it was believed that the 
government had no “power to disarm” the people whatsoever.119 
The lack of supporting authorities for the Court’s assertion that 
restrictions on a felon’s possession of firearms are “presumptively lawful” 
is disconcerting.  Considering the Court’s holding that the Second 
Amendment secures an individual right to bear arms, federal prohibitions 
against felon firearm possession may not be as secure as the Court initially 
presumed.  This is especially true in light of the majority’s assault on the 
idea that courts should conduct an “interest-balancing” approach to 
determine whether statutory burdens on a protected interest are proportional 
to the effects upon other governmental interests.120  Indeed, if an interest-
balancing test is conducted, some courts may find, as the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court found, that the burdens on ex-felons are proportional and 
reasonable to protect the governmental interest of protecting the safety and 
welfare of the public.121  The majority in Heller, however, scoffed at the 
idea of conducting an interest-balancing analysis, and noted that there is “no 
other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been 
subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”122  The majority 
went even further to refute the idea that a rational-basis scrutiny test should 
be the standard to evaluate regulations on constitutional guarantees: 
[R]ational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluating laws 
under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws.  In 
those cases, “rational basis” is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance 
of the constitutional guarantee.  Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate 
the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the 
freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the 
right to keep and bear arms.  If all that was required to overcome the right to bear 
 
118 Id. at 2790–2806. 
119 Id. at 2806. 
120 Id. at 2821.  
121 Smith v. State, 571 A.2d 279, 281 (N.H. 1990).  The New Hampshire court upheld the 
state felon firearm possession statute on the grounds that it is narrowly tailored to serve “a 
significant governmental interest in protecting the general public.”  Id. 
122 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.  The Court continues: “The very enumeration of the right 
takes out of the hands of government . . . the power to decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether the right is really worth insisting upon.  A constitutional guarantee subject to future 
judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”  Id. 
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arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the 
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.123 
It is difficult to see how the Court can so calmly promise that felon 
firearm possession prohibitions will be upheld when it so eagerly disposes 
of a balancing approach to determine the validity of firearm regulatory 
schemes in light of the “fundamental” rights guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment. 
The Federal Firearms Act created a very broad prohibition against the 
possession of firearms by anyone convicted of a federal felony.124  The 
prohibition is not narrowly tailored to prevent only violent felons from 
firearm possession like New Hampshire’s provision,125 nor does the 
restriction depend upon the time elapsed since the completion of the 
sentence as is the case in Oregon.126  The federal statute prohibits a person 
convicted of perjury from owning a gun, for example, even if the person has 
not been charged again for fifty years.127  Considering the Court’s position 
in Heller and the broad nature of the federal regulation,128 one can see how 
a plaintiff with a record similar to Mr. Britt’s could successfully challenge 
the federal law as overly restrictive of the individual constitutional right to 
bear arms. 
V. RESTORATION OF RIGHTS UPON REENTRY 
In order to adequately consider solutions that will prevent felon 
firearm possession statutes from being invalidated, it is important first to 
consider whether the right to bear arms should, in fact, be restored upon an 
ex-felon’s reentry into the community. 
The right to firearm possession is one of relatively few rights that ex-
felons are prohibited from exercising upon the completion of their 
sentences, on both the federal and the state level.  The United States 
Supreme Court has, however, “recognized . . . that a legislature 
 
123 Id. at 2817 n.27 (citations omitted). 
124 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006). 
125 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:3 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.) (prohibiting ex-felons 
convicted of violent felonies from possessing firearms). 
126 OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (2007) (prohibiting ex-felons convicted of nonviolent 
felonies from possessing firearms for fifteen years after the completion of their sentence). 
127 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-209 (2009) (classifying perjury as a felony offense). 
128 The Federal Firearms Act “has a strikingly large scope—a scope that might be 
arguably called into question by a fair reading of Heller’s rationale . . . .”  United States. v. 
Abner, Civil Action No. 3:08cr51-MHT, 2009 WL 103172, *1 (M.D. Ala., Jan. 14, 2009).  
The Court did not find a constitutional violation in this case, since plaintiff had a “serious 
history of violent crime of the highest magnitude, including state convictions for kidnapping 
and attempted murder.”  Id. 
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constitutionally may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in activities 
[other] than the possession of a firearm.”129  In North Carolina and many 
other jurisdictions, all rights other than the right to possess a firearm are 
automatically restored upon the completion of the felon’s sentence.130  
Various specific crimes may result in specific burdens after the completion 
of the offender’s sentence, such as sex offender registry requirements, but 
no government-imposed burdens fall on such a broad group of ex-offenders 
as does the prohibition against firearm possession.131 
The only civil right that is denied to the whole class of ex-felons with 
some frequency is the right to vote.  Only two states, however, Virginia and 
Kentucky, permanently disenfranchise persons with felony convictions.132  
Maine and Vermont allow felons to vote even while serving their 
sentence.133  Most states fall somewhere in between the two, permitting 
some, but not all, ex-felons to vote, or establishing a process by which 
voting rights can be restored.134  Despite the higher public tolerance for ex-
felon enfranchisement than for ex-felon firearm possession, the Supreme 
Court has expressly ruled that there is a constitutionally valid basis for 
preventing ex-felons from voting in federal elections.135 
 
129 Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 
U.S. 24 (1974)) (disenfranchisement); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) 
(proscription against holding office in a waterfront labor organization); Hawker v. New 
York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (prohibition against the practice of medicine). 
130 North Carolina automatically restores the rights of a convicted person upon (1) 
“discharge . . . by the State Department of Correction . . . or of a parolee by the Department 
of Correction;” (2) “[t]he unconditional pardon of the offender;” or (3) [t]he satisfaction by 
the offender of all conditions of a conditional pardon.”  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2009).  The 
statute provides similar conditions for ex-felons convicted by the federal government or 
convicted by other states.  Id. at § 13-1(4)–(5).  Ex-felons must re-register to vote, but they 
are permitted to do so freely once their sentence is served.  Id. at § 163-55. 
131 See, e.g., Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Programs, N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 14-208.5, et. seq (2009). 
132 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED 
States 1 (2009), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/ 
fd_bs_fdlawsinusMarch2010.pdf. 
133 See id. 
134 See id.  Many states simply require ex-felons to re-register to vote upon the 
completion of their sentence. 
135 In Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974), the Court found that a California 
law disenfranchising convicted felons who had completed their sentences does not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.  The Court relied primarily on legislative history to conclude 
that the Equal Protection Clause in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to 
override the express exemption permitting felon disenfranchisement in Section 2.  Id. at 55–
56.  The Court held that the language in Section 2 prohibiting the abridgement of the right to 
vote “except for participation in rebellion, or other crime” expressly permits states to 
disenfranchise felons.  Id.  Senator Feingold and Congressman Conyers have introduced 
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Research illustrates that ex-felons are most likely to become active, 
lawful participants in the community if they are given the same rights and 
opportunities as other community members upon release.136  Civil 
disabilities affect the ability for ex-felons to integrate fully into society 
upon release.  In interviews with ex-offenders, for example, researchers 
have “found evidence that disenfranchisement ‘carried a sting,’ was like 
‘salt in the wound,’ and ‘part of a larger package of restrictions that 
confounded efforts to become normal citizens.’”137 
While there are obvious emotional and politically expedient reasons to 
prohibit firearm possession by convicted felons, any limitations on rights 
after the completion of a felon’s sentence should be carefully evaluated.  In 
2004, the most recent year for which data is available, 1,078,920 people 
were convicted of a felony in state courts.138  Eighty-two percent of these 
felonies were categorized as “nonviolent” felonies by the Department of 
Justice.139  Is a person convicted of a nonviolent felony actually any more 
likely to commit a violent act with a firearm than someone who does not 
have a prior felony conviction?  Department of Justice studies show that 
sixty-seven percent of felons released in 1994 were convicted of a 
subsequent felony or serious misdemeanor, but there is little research 
regarding the prevalence of nonviolent ex-felons who commit subsequent 
violent felonies.140 
Certainly, our initial impulse may be to believe that convicted felons 
are more dangerous than ordinary citizens, regardless of the nonviolent 
nature of their first conviction.  The dissent in Britt, for example, 
determined that the prohibition was reasonable because “[o]ne who has 
committed a felony has displayed a degree of lawlessness that makes it 
 
legislation to ensure ex-felons’ right to vote is restored in federal elections after the 
successful completion of their sentence.  See Democracy Restoration Act of 2009, H.R.3335, 
111st Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Democracy Restoration Act of 2009, S.1516, 111st Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2009). 
136 See, e.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER 
REENTRY 105–39 (2003). 
137 Id. at 133. 
138 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, State Court Sentencing of 
Convicted Felons—Statistical Tables: Felony Sentences in State Court, 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04110tab.cfm (last updated Sep. 
9, 2010).  In the same year, the federal system convicted 66,518 adult felons.  Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Recidivism of Prisoners Released 
in 1994, Summary Findings, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
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entirely reasonable for the legislature, concerned for the safety of the public 
it represents, to want to keep firearms out of the hands of such a person.”141 
Despite Heller’s promises to the contrary, the Supreme Court’s 
determination that the right to bear arms is an individual right and its 
disapproval of the interest-balancing test for firearm regulations142 beg the 
question of whether the state’s interest in a slightly safer public is strong 
enough to trump the individual’s right to bear arms.  Certainly, in situations 
similar to Mr. Britt’s, where there is no evidence of dangerousness and thus 
no obvious benefit to the state, it will be difficult for the government to 
show that the law, as applied, furthers any sort of legitimate state interest. 
This is particularly true given Heller’s focus on the historical tie 
between the right to bear arms and the right to self-defense.143  If this 
historical analysis is taken as true, why would an ex-felon have less of a 
right to self-defense than a person with no felony convictions?  Taken one 
step further, does a person who lives in a home with an ex-felon have less 
of a right to self-defense than does a person who does not live with an ex-
felon?  Since Heller has determined that the language of the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to use firearms for self-
defense,144 firearm regulations will need to be reformed to respect the rights 
of ex-offenders, especially in cases where there is no evidence that the ex-
offender is particularly dangerous. 
VI. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ENSURE THE VALIDITY OF FELON 
POSSESSION STATUTES 
If courts continue to hold that the right to bear arms is a fundamental 
individual right and dispose of interest-balancing tests for determining the 
validity of firearm regulations, there are several options for states with 
schemes similar to North Carolina’s to protect the ability to legislate classes 
of citizens who may not possess firearms.  If, however, the American public 
and state legislatures determine, as some courts have, that the right to bear 
arms is truly a fundamental right and that the government has no power to 
 
141 Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 324 (N.C. 2009) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).  
An additional question is whether felon firearm statutes have any success in deterring and 
preventing ex-felons from obtaining firearms, considering that they have shown this 
tendency for “lawlessness” in the past.  See Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Two-Thirds of Former State Prisoners Rearrested for Serious New Crimes 
(June 2, 2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/rpr94pr.cfm (“Sixty-
seven percent of former inmates released from state prisons in 1994 committed at least one 
serious new crime in the following three years.”). 
142 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008). 
143 Id. at 2817–18. 
144 Id. at 2797. 
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disarm, then firearm possession statutes will soon go by the wayside.  If the 
public really believes the right to bear arms is a basic fundamental right,145 
then the right should indeed be restored upon the completion of an ex-
felon’s sentence, just as other rights that are deemed fundamental are 
restored in most jurisdictions.146  The success of many of these strategies 
will depend largely upon the direction that Second Amendment 
jurisprudence takes in the wake of McDonald.147 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION 
The surest route that states can take is to amend their state 
constitutions.  Currently, only Idaho’s constitution specifically permits laws 
against felon possession.148  It is certainly interesting to note that Idaho, 
which revised its constitution in the late 1970s, thought to include this 
provision, but other states have not followed suit. 
Some states have revised their constitutions to give the legislature a 
more explicit power to regulate the use of firearms, even if felon possession 
is not specifically mentioned.149  The Florida constitution, revised in 1968, 
provides an example.  The constitution provides that “the right of the people 
to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority 
of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms 
may be regulated by law.”150  Unfortunately, revising a state’s 
constitutional provision regarding the highly contentious right to bear arms 
will not be an easy task and may simply not be feasible in many states.  
Further, under McDonald, even if state regulations are valid under the state 
constitution they will need to pass muster under the Second Amendment.151  
Luckily, there is a variety of more accessible options for state legislatures to 
protect regulations against the possession of firearms by felons. 
B. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS 
First, state legislatures would be wise to consider whether it is 
necessary to prohibit all convicted felons from firearm possession or 
whether only violent ex-offenders should be restricted.  Some states, such 
as New Hampshire, implemented statutes that prohibit the possession of 
 
145 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010). 
146 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2009). 
147 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036. 
148 IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11. 
149 In the wake of McDonald, constitutional revisions may be invalidated by the federal 
Second Amendment.  McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036. 
150 FLA. CONST. § 8(a) (emphasis added). 
151 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036. 
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firearms only for those who have committed a felony against the person or 
property of another, or who have committed a drug-related felony—in 
essence, only prohibiting “dangerous” felons from possessing firearms.152  
Of course, as discussed earlier, it is difficult to measure whether or not 
persons convicted of previous felonies are more likely to commit future 
crimes with firearms.153 
Another option would be to permit nonviolent offenders to possess 
firearms, but to restrict the type of firearm they may possess.  This is the 
current proposal in the North Carolina state legislature, where legislators 
have proposed a bill to permit nonviolent offenders certain “hunting” 
rights.154  These statutes rely on the fact that most crimes conducted with 
firearms are conducted with handguns rather than sporting rifles,155 but do 
not explicitly evaluate the dangerousness of the ex-felon.  If ex-felons 
convicted of nonviolent felonies are indeed statistically more dangerous, 
however, permitting even limited gun rights may be a questionable practice. 
Several states have struck an interesting balance between the right to 
bear arms and the public safety concern that results from ex-felon firearm 
possession.  One avenue some jurisdictions have explored is the 
establishment of a restoration date.156  This scheme permits the restoration 
of the right to possess firearms a certain number of years after time served 
and often permits automatic restoration for nonviolent, first-time 
offenders.157  Statutes with restoration date provisions permit ex-felons, 
 
152 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:3 (2009); see also State v. Smith, 571 A.2d 279, 281 
(1990). 
153 Department of Justice studies show that sixty-seven percent of felons released in 1994 
were convicted of a subsequent felony or serious misdemeanor, but there is little research 
regarding the prevalence of nonviolent ex-felons who commit subsequent violent felonies. 
See Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 141. 
154 H.B. 1444, 2009 Gen. Assem., 2009 Sess. (N.C. 2009). 
155 Approximately seventy-five percent of gun-related homicides in 2005 were 
committed with a handgun.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE 
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 137, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/htius.pdf. 
156 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270(4)(a) (2007). 
157 In Oregon, for example, ex-felons are prohibited from firearm possession except for 
persons: 
[c]onvicted of only one felony under the law of this state or any other state, or who has been 
convicted of only one felony under the laws of the United States, which felony did not involve 
criminal homicide, as defined in ORS 163.005, or the possession or use of a firearm or a weapon 
having a blade that projects or swings into position by force of a spring or by centrifugal force, 
and who has been discharged from imprisonment, parole or probation for said offense for a 
period of 15 years prior to the date of alleged violation of subsection (1) of this section. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (4)(a). 
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such as Mr. Britt, who have shown themselves to be law-abiding members 
of the community, to regain the ability to possess certain firearms.  These 
statutes essentially allow ex-felons a “second chance” to prove they are 
law-abiding, despite their previous convictions. 
Other states allow ex-felons to request hearings to restore their gun 
rights after a certain number of years have passed since their sentence was 
completed.158  These hearings give the opportunity for ex-felons to “prove” 
that they are now nonviolent and law-abiding citizens despite their previous 
convictions.159  These statutes have an obvious safety advantage over 
statutes that automatically restore the right within a certain number of years 
because the hearings allow the opportunity for both the ex-felon and the 
state to present evidence regarding possible dangerous tendencies even if 
there have been no subsequent charges against the individual.160  If properly 
executed, these hearings can ensure that dangerous persons are not 
permitted to possess firearms, regardless of how long ago they were 
convicted of a crime, instead of making broad generalization about the 
dangerousness of particular types of felons.  Realistically, the procedural 
requirements for these hearings are not always a difficult obstacle in the 
path to firearm possession.161  Provided that the hearings are reasonably 
restrictive, hearings may be the best alternative to ensure dangerous felons 
are not able to possess weapons without unduly burdening the right to bear 
arms of all ex-felons regardless of dangerousness. 
The question remains, however, whether these statutory solutions 
would rely too heavily on an interest-balancing test to be upheld—exactly 
the sort of test that Heller dismisses as inappropriate for individual rights.162  
 
158 WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040 (West, Westlaw through all 2010 legislation). 
159 See Matthew R. Kite, State v. Radan: Upsetting the Balance of Public Safety and the 
Right to Bear Arms, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 201, 211 (2001).  
160 Id.  
161 See id.  The ex-felon in State v. Radan committed a felony in Montana and moved to 
Washington after release.  The Court held that while Montana’s automatic restoration of 
plaintiff’s civil rights did not meet the hearing requirement under Washington statute, the 
“facts of a felon’s early discharge from parole, accompanied by an automatic restorations of 
rights, meets the statute’s meaning of an ‘other equivalent procedure,’ thus restoring a 
felon’s right to possess firearms in Washington, without actually going through the hearing 
process.”  Id. at 202 (citing State v. Radan, 21 P.3d 255, 261 (2001)). 
162 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2009) (“[N]o other enumerated 
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-
balancing’ approach.  The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of 
government . . . the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth 
insisting upon.  A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its 
usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”). 
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Thus far, however, even the North Carolina courts have refused to entirely 
eliminate the interest-balancing test.163 
A final option would be to leave the statutes as they are, under an 
assumption that Mr. Britt’s case is a rarity, and allow courts to deal with 
plaintiffs on a case-by-case basis.  Yet such a decision ignores the 
likelihood that there are and will continue to be plaintiffs similar to Mr. 
Britt who cannot be shown to be dangerous.  If the statutes are not revised 
and there are enough Britt-like plaintiffs, the statutes may be in danger of 
eventually being overturned. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Whether or not more jurisdictions will continue to judicially eat away 
at felon firearm restrictions is yet to be seen, but Britt v. State shows that 
many current state firearm restrictions likely will no longer be considered 
constitutionally viable in the wake of Heller and McDonald. 
Going forward, it will be important for state legislatures to continue to 
consider the implications of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
McDonald.164  Even if the Court continues to suggest felon firearm statutes 
are valid despite the incorporation of the Second Amendment against the 
states, it will be difficult to prevent additional states from finding as the 
Britt court did. 
Unless the Court—and the country—retreat from the opinion that 
Americans have an individual right to bear arms, laws preventing felons 
from possessing firearms will be challenged and potentially stripped away.  
According to the majority in Heller, the right to bear arms cannot at once be 
inalienable and subject to restrictions.165  Legislatures must act to ensure 
that firearm restrictions remain valid to keep firearms out of the hands of 
only those who are most likely to misuse them. 
 
163 State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009). 
164 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
165 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. 
